Money Politics in Aceh: A Structuration Approach to Social Structure and Agency Interactions

Abstract

Money politics undermines the integrity of the democratic process in Indonesia, particularly in regional head elections (pilkada). This practice involves giving money or goods to voters to influence their choices, often through "serangan fajar" (dawn attacks) just before voting. This study focuses on the case of Aceh, the only region in Indonesia granted the authority to implement Islamic law, yet still grappling with money politics issues. This research aims to analyze money politics within the framework of Giddens' structuration theory (structure-agency). Using a holistic approach, the study seeks to understand how social structures, norms, and regulations influence the actions of agents. Conducted through library research, this study relies primarily on literature and archival data. The findings reveal that the prohibition of money politics is supported by legal and normative structures, but the socio-economic conditions of impoverished communities allow this practice to thrive. Individual agency exploits these conditions to achieve political goals, with rationalizations that justify their actions. These findings identify critical points for intervention to reduce money politics practices and highlight the importance of political empowerment strategies to eradicate this issue in Aceh.